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ne striking discovery of Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Modernity 
is that no morality is formulated in modernity.  Modernity thinks so 
much of the unthought that it fails to address the ethical question of 
how one is to live well.1 Thinking the unthought is constitutive of “modern 
morality,” which is not morality at all.2 If morality is nothing but the effort to 
answer how one is to live well, then, modernity fails to address this moral, 
ethical question. 
When “man”3 emerges as the positive figure in the field of knowledge, 
modern thought needs to grapple with those dim, yet positive forces that 
motivate action.  “What is essential [to modern episteme] is that thought, both 
for itself and in the density of its workings, should be both knowledge and a 
modification of what it knows, reflection and a transformation of the mode of 
being of that on which it reflects.”4 
                                                 
1 In its effort to conceive man, modernity, Foucault opines, reflects on the duality of 
the cogito and the unthought which characterizes man’s mode of being; hence, in Foucault’s 
own neologism, the “cogito-unthought duality.” This duality is an expression of the basic reality 
of man both as an experiencing subject and the never-fully-understood or often-misunderstood 
object of that experience.  By understanding human consciousness as inextricably linked to the 
unthought, modernity is “a form of reflection…that involves, for the first time, man’s being in 
that dimension where thought addresses the unthought and articulates itself upon it.” Michel 
Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 
1994), 325. 
2 Traditionally, morality consists of two aspects: “moral code” and “morality of 
behaviors.” While morality as “moral code” refers to a prescriptive ensemble of values or rules 
of action, “morality of behaviors” refers to the real behavior of individuals with respect to the 
rules and values recommended to them.  Foucault says that there is more to Morality than this.  
He identifies another form that complements the traditional form of morality.  This is Foucault’s 
“ethics,” the rapport á soi.  The kind of relationship one ought to have with oneself, “ethics” 
determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own 
actions.  Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of the Work in Progress,” 
in Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, volume 1 of The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed.  by Paul 
Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al (New York: The New Press, 1997), 263. 
3 Foucault identifies “man” as the lacuna characteristic of Modernity.  He claims: 
“Before the end of the eighteenth century, man did not exist.” Foucault, The Order of Things, 308.   
With this statement, Foucault does not mean that no human being as a biological species existed 
before the nineteenth century.  Foucault is not stupid to say that.  Foucault’s “man” is not simply 
the two-legged creature who has brains for articulating speech and abstract reasoning.  Gutting 
explains that “man” is used by Foucault to refer to human beings precisely as those individuals 
for whom representations exist.  Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 198.     
4 Foucault, The Order of Things, 327.   
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It is impossible for modernity to formulate any kind of morality, 
Foucault claims.  Modernity cannot propose a morality not because it is pure 
speculation but because it is a mode of action: “[Modern thought] is reflection, 
the act of consciousness, the elucidation of what is silent, language restored to 
what is mute, the illumination of the element of darkness that cuts man off 
from himself, the reanimation of the inert.”5 Not only is modern thought a 
mode of action, it also is a perilous action: “As soon as [thought] functions it 
offends or reconciles, attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites or reunites; it 
cannot help but liberate and enslave.”6  
The Kantian Categorical Imperative is an instance of an absence of 
morality.  Foucault explains: “The Kantian moment…is the discovery that the 
subject, in so far as he is reasonable, applies to himself his own law, which is 
the universal law.”7 Dreyfus and Rabinow elaborate this point.  Recognizing 
the Sartrean undertone in Foucault’s reading of the Kantian Categorical 
Imperative, they write: “Whoever achieves total clarity about himself and 
society would, indeed be a sovereign chooser, but a sovereign that no longer 
had any reasons for his choice.”8 Acting on a maxim that can be universalized 
is the action of a reasonable subject but it postpones, if not leaves out, “doing 
good.” Action in modern times is ontologically prior to anything.   The act of 
reflecting on the “cogito-unthought” duality so preoccupies modernity that it 
fails to be anything other than this reflective act, suspending, therefore, any 
ethical act.    
The absence of morality in Modernity prompted Foucault to do an 
excursion into Greek culture and thought.  He explains: “If I was interested in 
Antiquity it was because…the idea of a morality as obedience to a code of rules 
is now disappearing, has already disappeared.”9 That moderns trust and believe 
s o  m u c h  i n  “ m a n ”  a n d  t h a t  w e  f i n d  i t  h a r d  t o  t h i n k  d i f f e r e n t l y  f r o m  t h e  
modern way of thinking, we have lost the moral sense.  The search for 
“aesthetics of existence” is Foucault’s response to the absence of morality.10 
 
The “Aesthetics of Existence” 
 
In Greek ethics people were concerned with their moral 
conduct, their ethics, their relations to themselves and to 
others…what they were worried about, their theme was 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 328.   
6 Ibid.   
7 Foucault, The Order of Things, footnote no.  2, 343. 
8 Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd 
ed.  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 37.   
9 Michel Foucault, “An Aesthetics of Existence,” in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, 
Culture, ed.  by Lawrence Kritzman, trans. by Alan Sheridan et al (New York: Routledge, 1990), 
49.  
10 Ibid.  
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to constitute a kind of ethics which was an aesthetics of 
existence.
11  
 
If Mona Lisa could be painted beautifully, if the Pieta or the statue of 
David could be carved perfectly, if the music of the Baroque, Classical and 
Romantic periods could be appreciated well, and if Oscar-winning films were 
good forms of entertainment, why couldn’t one’s life be lived aesthetically? 
Living a beautiful life was what the Hellenistic and Roman world offered for us 
people of today.  We can learn from the Greco-Roman citizens how to live 
such a life.   
Ancient Greeks were concerned with constituting a beautiful, aesthetic 
life out of their own lives more than anything.  To them, ethics was not so 
much about following the norms their society imposed on them thereby 
pleasing other members in the society and was not so much about following 
religious orders in order to please their gods; rather, ethics was mainly about 
one’s choice to live a beautiful life.12 
We ask the question: What makes the “aesthetics of existence” 
beautiful?13 What makes this existence moral? As a response to the first 
question, Foucault writes: The “aesthetics of existence” “took on the brilliance 
of a beauty that was revealed to those able to behold it or keep its memory 
present in mind.”14 The “aesthetic of existence” is a beautiful thing esteemed as 
beautiful by a beholder such that we can say that the beauty of this existence is 
said to be “in the eyes of the beholder.” It is the beholder who appreciates this 
beautiful existence precisely as beautiful.   
However, this beholder is only there to appreciate this beautiful 
existence and is not the one who constitutes it as beautiful.  For, this aesthetic 
existence is objectively beautiful.  Like any other beautiful things, the 
“aesthetics of existence,” taking on the brilliance of a beauty, is an instance of 
“Beauty.” There is an objectivity to the beauty of the “aesthetics of existence” 
and this is what the beholder beholds.  The “beauty” of this existence, its 
“aesthetic” effect, lies in its moral worth.   
O’Leary elaborates this point.  He asks what is “aesthetic” about the 
“aesthetics of existence.” Casting doubt on Foucault’s understanding of the 
two key terms in Greek thought, techne as “art” and kalon as “beautiful,” 
                                                 
11 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” 255.   
12 Commentators distinguish between the two senses of ethics that are at play in 
Foucault’s work.  Deleuze writes: “The key thing, for Foucault, is that subjectification isn’t to do 
with morality, with any moral code: it’s ethical and aesthetic, as opposed to morality, which 
partakes of knowledge and power.” Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-1990 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), 114.   Likewise, according to Raymond Geuss, there is a 
difference between ethics as a set of moral codes and ethics as a ways of seeing the world.  See 
Outside Ethics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
13 For a discussion of Foucault’s “aesthetics of existence,” see Neil Levy’s “Ethics and 
Rules: A Political Reading of Foucault’s Aesthethics of Existence,” in Philosophy Today, 42:1 
(Spring 1998), 79-84. 
14 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, volume 2 of The History of Sexuality, trans. by 
Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 89.  
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O’Leary investigates how some ancient Greek philosophers understood and 
used these terms.  Plato considers techne or “craft” as analogous to the practice 
of virtue; to him, courage is a skill or craft similar to medicine.  Aristotle’s good 
man is one who is able to hit the mean; he is like a shoemaker who makes the 
neatest or the best shoe out of the supplied leather.  Epictetus compares 
himself to a craftsman who molds his students.  What is central in Hellenistic 
thought, O’Leary argues, is the idea that virtue is a “techne tou biou,” which can 
be literally translated as “skill in living,” or poetically described as “aesthetics of 
existence.” Here is O’Leary: “The conceptualization of the good man as he 
who knows his ‘materials’…and as he who possesses the skill required to put 
his life together in such a way that it will bring its ‘craftsman’ both happiness 
and prosperity.”15 In Greek thought, the ideas of the good and the beautiful 
collapse onto each other.  This collapse is what Foucault exploits with his 
translation and understanding of “techne tou biou” as “aesthetics of existence.” 
The person who creates himself as a work of art is one who fashions 
or molds himself to be a virtuous man.  A beautiful man is one who is a good 
man.  This leads us to our second question: What makes the “aesthetics of 
existence” ethical? Explaining the moral value this “aesthetics of existence” 
has, Foucault writes: “An ‘aesthetics of existence’ is a way of life whose moral 
value [depends] on certain formal principles certain formal principles in the use 
of pleasures, in the way one distributed them, in the limits one observed, in the 
hierarchy one respected.”16 In another passage, he writes: “The will to be a 
moral subject and the search for an ethics of existence were…mainly an 
attempt to affirm one’s liberty and to give one’s own life a certain form.”17 
Living a beautiful, ethical existence is to “stylize” or give form to one’s self. 
One way of stylizing oneself is by practicing temperance.  If one were 
to live a beautiful life, s/he has to hit the “golden mean.” Foucault quotes 
some passages from the works of Plato to give us a glimpse of this moderate, 
aesthetic existence.  Plato writes in Gorgias: “The soul which has order is 
orderly? Of course it is.  And the orderly soul is temperate? It certainly must 
be.  Then the temperate soul is good…And if they are true, then apparently the 
man who wants to be happy must pursue and practice temperance.”18 In the 
Republic, Plato writes: “When a man’s soul has a beautiful character, and his 
body matches it in beauty and is thus in harmony with it, that harmonizing 
combination…is the most beautiful spectacle for anyone who has eyes to 
see…the right kind of love is to love a well-behaved and beautiful person with 
moderation and restraint.”19  
Temperance, moderation was the virtue characteristic of a true man in 
the “virile” society of Greek antiquity.  If a man were to be truly man, he had 
to practice moderation with his use of pleasures: “In the use of male pleasures, 
                                                 
15 Timothy O’Leary, Foucault: The Art of Ethics (London and New York: Continuum, 
2002), 52. 
16 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 89.   
17 Foucault, “An Aesthetics of Existence,” 49. 
18 Plato, Gorgias, 506d-507d; as quoted by Foucault in The Use of Pleasure, 90. 
19 Plato, Republic, 402d-403b; as quoted by Foucault in The Use of Pleasure, 90.    
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one had to be virile with regard to oneself, just as one was masculine in one’s 
social role.  In the full meaning of the word, moderation was a man’s virtue.”20 
A man was said to be virile and strong if he was able to conquer and tame his 
own desires, if he was able to practice moderation with the use of his desires.  
Moderation characterized manhood and virility for the ancient Greeks. 
  Moderation, apart from characterizing manhood, also determined 
whether a man had mastery, dominion over himself.  To be a master of oneself 
was necessary before one could exercise dominion over others.  If a man were 
not a master of himself, he could not be a strong and true man.  Moreover, he 
could not be an effective father to his children, a good husband to his wife, and 
a good, active partner with his boy.  We can see here that the “aesthetics of 
existence” is an ethics that is not egotistic or narcissistic; for, after governing 
oneself well, it then seeks to govern others well.  It has, should have, a political 
dimension.  It should not remain within the confines of oneself but should go 
out and reach out to others. 
Governing oneself well which eventually enables one to govern others 
well, exercising moderation with one’s use of pleasures, mastering oneself – all 
this typifies a life that is lived aesthetically, morally.  Living an aesthetic 
existence is primarily a personal choice.  If one chooses to live such an 
existence, one wills to live a beautiful life.  Living a beautiful life is living well.  
Foucault explains: “This elaboration of one’s own life as personal work of 
art…was at the centre…of moral experience, of the will to morality.”21 
Choosing to live an aesthetic existence is a personal ethics.  Being personal, this 
ethics can be lived by the ethical subject who constitutes his existence 
beautifully as he possibly can. 
 
The Ethical Subjectivity of a Greek Boy 
 
Foucault discusses in The Use of Pleasure three practices by which 
ancient Greek men sought to “stylize” themselves, i.e., to live the “aesthetics of 
existence.” There is their dietary practice Foucault discusses under 
“Dietetics.”22 Their practice of domestic government is discussed under 
“Economics,”23 and their love/sexual relationship with a free-born Greek boy 
is discussed under “Erotics.”24 Dietetics was understood as an art of the 
everyday relationship of a man with his body; economics was an art of the 
conduct of man as a head of his family; and, erotics as an art of the conduct of 
both man and boy in a love/sexual relationship.25 We focus ourselves on the 
last stylization, especially that of the boy’s. 
A sexual relation between a man and a boy in Greek antiquity, viz., 
“erotics,” was a big problem for the Greeks.  It was a big problem for Greek 
                                                 
20 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 83.   
21 Foucault, “An Aesthetics of Existence,” p.  49.    
22 See Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 95-139.   
23 Ibid., 141-184. 
24 Ibid., 185-225. 
25 Ibid., 93.    
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ethics and thought on account of the paradoxical status of the boy.  Foucault 
calls this problem the “antimony of the boy.”26 That a boy has not yet achieved 
his full manly status, he may be an object of pleasure and may be a prey of 
men’s sexual desires.  However, he would soon pass his youth and become a 
man himself.  And so, the ancient Greeks were pre-occupied with the question: 
To what extent could a boy be an object of pleasure? How can a boy be truly 
man when at one point of his life he was objectified? How can he be a true 
master of himself, be a true subject of his pleasures when he once was an object 
of other’s pleasures? 
In the domination-submission structure or active-passive structure of 
Greek antiquity, it was not a problem to be domineering or active or that it was 
all right for Greek male citizens to be subjects of their pleasures.  However, it 
was unacceptable, deplorable, improper or objectionable for any of them 
(including would-be men) to be an object of pleasure.  It was all right for 
Greek men to have Greek boys.  Mature male citizens, being free and being 
men themselves, had the freedom to choose from so-called “boy-objects,” with 
whom they engage in a love/sexual relationship. 
The status of the Greek boy, however, was a big problem for ancient 
Greeks.  Greek sexual ethics articulates: A boy should never be an object of 
anybody’s pleasures.  Here is Foucault: “The relationship that [the boy] was 
expected to establish with himself in order to become a free man, master of 
himself and capable of prevailing over others, was at variance with a form of 
relationship in which he would be an object of pleasure for another.”27  
The antimony of the boy was for the Greeks more complicated than 
the status of wives.  While the wife, if she is worthy of respect, remains under 
the exclusive authority of her husband who, being a master of himself and of 
his household, governs his wife; the boy, on the other hand, constitutes an 
independent center vis-à-vis his suitors/lovers: “[Erotics] implied self-mastery 
on the part of the lover; it also implied an ability on the part of the beloved to 
establish a relation of dominion; and lastly, it implied a relationship between 
their two moderations, expressed in their deliberate choice of one another.”28  
In relation to his suitors, a boy is free and independent.  It is his 
discretion to reject or accept their proposals and no one can influence his 
decisions.  Inasmuch as Greek male citizens had the freedom to choose their 
Greek boys, Greek boys also had the freedom to choose their male-lovers.  He 
may entertain as many suitors as he possibly can.  When he has accepted a 
suitor to be his lover, however, he is expected to give himself freely to his 
partner.  Foucault writes: “The boy was expected to give, out of kindness and 
not for his own pleasure, something that his partner sought with a view to the 
pleasure he would enjoy; but the partner could not rightfully ask for it without 
a matching offer of presents, services, promises, and commitments that were 
altogether different in nature from the ‘gift’ that was made to him.”29   
                                                 
26 Ibid., 221.   
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 203.   
29 Ibid., 224-225.    
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What is at stake in the game of “erotics” is the stylization of both 
parties: the stylization of the suitor and that of the boy.  This stylization is 
living a beautiful, moral life expected of the lovers engaged in “erotics.” Like 
any other love-relations, “erotics” is a give-and-take relationship.  It is two-way.  
A suitor, if he really likes the boy, is expected to give and show his best so the 
boy may choose him to be his lover.  And if he is chosen by the boy to be his 
lover, he is expected to give the best of himself.  How does a Greek boy stylize 
himself in “erotics”? He should not be a prostitute.  He should not abuse his 
suitors or beloved.  He should be free: free in choosing who his partner will be; 
free in giving himself to his partner; free in exercising his pleasures; and, free in 
not engaging in “erotics” anymore, if he ever chooses.  If he were to live the 
“aesthetics of existence,” the Greek boy must preserve his honor and must use 
his pleasures well. 
The boy stylizes himself in such a way that he preserves his honor, his 
eminent worth, which is what is really at stake in the game of “erotics.” The 
boy’s honor is related not to his future marriage but to his status, his future 
place in the society.  To preserve his honor and worth, the boy should mind his 
own conduct and use his pleasures well.  If a boy misuses his pleasures, if he 
misbehaves and dishonors himself during his youth, he is deemed unworthy of 
governing the affairs of society.  Foucault gives a general description of a boy’s 
“misuse” of his pleasures: 
 
It was not good…for a boy to behave ‘passively,’ to let 
himself be manipulated and dominated, to yield without 
resistance, to become an obliging partner in the sensual 
pleasures of the other, to indulge his whims, and to offer 
his body to whomever it pleased and however it pleased 
them, out of weakness, lust, or self-interest.
30 
 
Conclusion 
 
In Foucauldian ethics, we are dealing with a person, yes, but, more 
fundamentally, we are dealing with a person who acts.  By dealing with the 
acting person, we do not just focus ourselves on the person himself, nor on his 
actions alone.  We do not separate the person from his acts.  What Foucault 
tries to resolve in his “ethics” is not only how one constitutes his ethical 
subjectivity but also why this particular action of a person exists and not any 
other action.  Asking the latter question entails investigation of the relation of 
this one act to other acts done by the person we are dealing with.  A person’s 
act becomes a “text” that the archaeological method diagnoses. 
There is no universal way as to how one could constitute one’s ethical 
subjectivity.  There are as many ways of constituting ethical subjectivity as there 
are individual persons.  The “aesthetics of existence” is unique to every 
individual who chooses to live a beautiful existence.  There is no universality 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 211.    
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with the “aesthetics of existence.” Or, the universality of this beautiful 
existence is its very particularity or individuality in every ethical subject.  No 
one can impose one’s ethical subjectivity onto another person.  What one can 
do best is offer one’s ethical subjectivity as a sample-subjectivity which other 
persons may accept or reject.   
It is not a matter of determining which subjectivity is the best, better 
or worse than the other.  The ethical subjectivities of the ancient Greeks are 
not better or worse subjectivities than, say, modern or Christian subjectivities.  
Every subjectivity is the best, which is the same as saying, no subjectivity is the 
best.  One’s subjectivity may be the best for oneself but it may not be good for 
others.   
What matters is one person constituting his or her own ethical 
subjectivity with respect to one’s customs and traditions, the norms and values 
one’s society upholds, one’s religious beliefs and convictions, and many other 
factors.  The ethical subject could constitute his or her ethical subjectivity, s/he 
could live a beautiful existence, s/he could create a work of art out of his or 
her life, if and when s/he considers the ethos o f h is so ciet y.  To wit , with 
respect to moral practices, ethical subjectivity may be constituted. 
 
The Graduate School, University of Santo Tomas, Philippines 
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